Archive for the ‘Africa’ Category

So You Want to Know About…the Luo

Wednesday, November 12th, 2008

Another thing that came up in a recent email exchange was a request for “starter scholarship” on a particular African nation. For most contemporary African countries, I really feel that there is not a single great “done-in-one” book that is about that nation’s history in general. There are very good books about regions, about particular ethnic groups, about issues which affect multiple nations in Africa, or about localities and communities. But I get these requests so often in email, often from people who are planning to travel to some particular African country or who are soon to be stationed there in the Peace Corps or for some other reason, that I was thinking that I should publish a regular series of bibliographic recommendations.

So let’s start with a very appropriate list given the November news: the Luo people of Western Kenya, where the President-Elect’s father was from.

The Luo people live in present-day Kenya and parts of Uganda and Tanzania. They speak a Nilotic language related to languages spoken elsewhere in northeastern Africa. Much of the attention to their history and experience as a people centers on their political and social status within Kenya since independence.

None of these books are popular page-turners, keep in mind. I’m very fond of the Cohen-Odhiambo books not just because of personal connections but also as historiographical and methdological statements, but if your goal is to get a simple working knowledge of the Luo, you may find them frustrating.

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Tom Mboya, The Challenge of Nationhood: A Collection of Speeches and Writings
The words and thoughts of the charismatic Luo nationalist (who started a scholarship program that benefitted the young Barack Obama Senior, the President’s father). Mboya was assassinated in 1969.

E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and David William Cohen, Siaya: The Historical Anthropology of an African Landscape.
Innovative, unusually structured exploration of themes in the 20th Century experience of Luo communities. Don’t read it expecting to get a bullet-point account of Luo history: it’s an attempt to explore the meanings and consciousness circulating within Luo communities from the inside out.

E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and David William Cohen, Burying SM. Like Siaya, a deliberately digressive, meditative account, in this case, focusing on the long legal and political struggle over the right to bury a Kenyan lawyer named S.M. Otieno. His wife wanted to bury him as a Christian, maintaining that his primary identity in life was as a modern, educated and national person, while his Luo relatives wanted to bury him according to Luo traditions, maintaining that Otieno had defined himself first and foremost as Luo.

Bethwell A. Ogot, History of the Southern Luo. A very carefully composed and thorough monograph. Not a page-turner but one of those works of history which everyone in the field ends up using as a standard reference.

Parker Shipton, “Debts and Trespasses: Land, Mortgages, and the Ancestors in Western Kenya”, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 62, No. 3, (1992), pp. 357-388. Goes well with Siaya. Shipton has a new book on some of these themes which I have not read yet.

On Its Stomach

Friday, November 7th, 2008

The news from eastern Congo is, as it has long been, not good. I understand why outside mediators and observers want to keep trying to patch up old cease-fires or broker new ones between the ever-shifting array of combatants in the region. It’s a pointless effort, however.

Cease-fires work between combatants who have been using warfare as a means to achieve a political end which is separable from war itself. They work when those combatants are mutually convinced that further attempts to achieve those ends by military means are likely to be fruitless, or that there is more risk involved in continuing to fight than there is in ending the fight. They work when one power has achieved all that it reasonably can hope to achieve through military means and the other power is looking for a graceful way to acknowledge defeat or loss.

War in the eastern Congo is politics. There isn’t any state or sovereignty outside of armed combatants. The state which exists around Kinshasa may technically own the territory of eastern Congo, but it has no real governing authority there beyond its own projection of military force. As Thomas Turner has written, the political economy of eastern Congo is plunder. People who are not part of a band of armed men are resources to the armies, nothing more. They are not ruled or controlled or part of a sovereignty. If you want an analogy in European history, the Hundred Years’ War in France is fairly close: mercenary bands composed of men from many parts of Western Europe prowling the countryside, taking what they please, killing, maiming and raping the peasantry, sometimes working for established nobles or the monarchy, sometimes against them.

Though if that’s the analogy, the Congolese peasantry has yet to have its jacquerie, more’s the pity. Without the civilian population who surge from refugee camp to refugee camp, these armies would struggle to survive. They’d have no labor to conscript for pit-mining, no farmers whose crops they could steal, no women to rape. But there is no way to take the civilian population permanently out of the picture. I almost wish that the U.S., Canada and Western Europe could offer residency permits to every single resident of eastern Congo, agree to transport everyone accepting the offer, and give each of them a transitional allowance until they get established in their host country. That can’t happen, and the local alternative forms of refugee housing simply move the bullseye target for victimization around from place to place, border to border.

No cease-fire will hold until the armed men themselves want to stop fighting because they’re tired of it, see no future in it, or until some regional power (the Congo government or some other) is able to project overwhelming military force in a sustained way throughout the entire region. Given its topography, that’s very unlikely barring a massive investment by outside parties. So the mediators will fret, the UN will rattle its very small sabers, and the suffering will continue.

Not Even Wrong

Tuesday, September 23rd, 2008

I missed this story when it first appeared, but apparently Rush Limbaugh has been saying that Barack Obama’s father was actually an Arab from “an Arab part of Africa”. Look, why bother with real places at all, if you’re comfortable saying this sort of thing in public with millions of people listening? Just say that Obama’s father was a Calormene from Tashbaan and his mother was a Ferengi who ran a bar for Denebian slime devils.

But this does show you something about the persistence of culture, though. There is a kind of thermodynamics to narratives and rumor that achieve a certain degree of initial circulation. They can be created, but they’re almost impossible to destroy. What I think some village idiot on Limbaugh’s staff (or some other deranged partisan workshop) pulled out of the cultural substrate of the last two hundred years is a kind of mutant offspring of the “Hamitic myth” plus a hazy fragment or two of the history of Swahili society in East Africa.

The “Hamitic myth” was a proto-imperial view held by some European travellers and observers that African societies, particularly in East and Southern Africa, could be distinguished by whether they were original to Africa or composed of alien and more ‘evolved’ outsiders who came from the Middle East. The basic historical picture drawn by the myth was wrong, and its imagined racial hierarchy even more so. However, East African societies over the last two millennia were shaped a great deal by successive migrations of different linguistic and cultural groups and forms through the region. Some of those migrations passed through from west to east, or northwest to southeast, some from north to south, and some back in the other direction. Particularly at the northern end of the region, there were some connections to the historical world of the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. The Luo people (Obama’s father was Luo) speak a Nilotic language, which connects them in diffuse ways with other people spread through East and Northeast Africa. Also, the Swahili coast of East Africa (which is not where Luo-speakers come from), has long been shaped by cultural and economic interaction with the societies of western India, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Saying that this in any way connects Obama to the Middle East through descent is like saying that my heritage is partly French because the name Burke in Ireland came originally from Norman invaders, or that my heritage is Spanish because de Burgos or de Burca was a Hispano-Norman surname. You can’t slap contemporary national and ethnic labels down on histories where those labels make no sense at all. Actually, it’s not even that close. It’s like saying that because my great-grandfather came from Ireland, and Ireland was sometimes invaded by Vikings, and Vikings were connected to Germany, and the Mongols defeated Teutonic Knights in 1241 and probably there was some interbreeding involved in all those connections and hence I am probably at least a bit Mongol.

Many white Americans like to imagine a loose, affectionate connection to one or several ethnic or national “original” identities connected to one or more immigrant ancestors. That often gets looser and more imaginary the further people get from the historical moment of immigration. So the Ireland that a group of Irish-American families I grew up with could imagine was built from Darby O’Gill and the Little People, lots of Chieftains albums, and occasional boozy donations to the IRA made in pubs or when someone passed a hat at a party. That’s ok: I honestly don’t think people mistook that for reality, or made strong claims based on the more or less harmless and romantic images involved. (Though obviously that trickle of money to the IRA had some real meaning in the world, if it actually ever got to them.) This is the same kind of historical register that encouraged people to account themselves 1/16th Cherokee, or after Roots, that engendered new rememberings of descent from stolen royalty in Africa for some African-Americans. This is often a good, creative use of history, a way to try and locate oneself and one’s family in time and space. In American society, it’s a subtle counterbalance to the relentless pressure to constantly reinvent oneself, to fit into changing places, changing needs.

But this kind of memory can become a rotten, decomposing foundation for self-understanding when it starts to believe too much in the fixity and stability of the past it has set its eye upon. When any “European-American” forgets (or never knew) how much the making of “Europe” is both recent and how much movement of people, goods, ideas and culture in, out and through the borders of what we now think of as Europe has been involved over the long haul. The same goes for any European (or other) nationality that one wishes to claim as heritage. The pleasant (or even grim) heritage you may think about as your roots is almost certainly a far more recent and shallow thing that you know. But precisely because many Americans regard heritage in a somewhat romanticized, somewhat imaginary way, as a set of selections off an a la carte memory menu, this kind of gibberish coming from someone like Limbaugh may sound plausible in some sort of way.

Chickens Not Counted

Tuesday, September 16th, 2008

I don’t see any reason for enthusiasm about the signing of a Zimbabwean power-sharing agreement. Whether it will be at all meaningful not only remains to be seen, but depends very much on changes that are very much below the visible surface of events.

When I was in graduate school, the students working on doctorates in history and anthropology who had an interest in Africa met once a year with a group of doctoral candidates studying African affairs who were working in a public policy institution affiliated with my university. We presented our work in progress to each other. It was an awkward meeting for both sides.

The problem for me then (and now) is that the policy scholars treated at least most issues and problems as amenable to policy. Not just a custom-designed, situational policy, in fact, but a policy recipe or formula that could be applied to a broad range of supposedly similar situations. For some problems, that was fine, either because the issue at hand was already circumscribed by the formalities of the interstate system or lay well within the formal infrastructure of the global economy. In other cases, while local histories and practices might affect how a policy would be received or implemented, the formula seemed sound enough to me.

But I remember one presentation very well, in which the student (with very evident support from one of the senior professors in his program) laid out a ten-step procedure for negotiating an end to civil conflicts in Africa. This was in the 1980s, mind you, so some of the most uncontrollable and violent insurgencies in contemporary Africa had not yet become prominent. This student was mostly addressing the situation in Angola and Mozambique, where external actors were playing a big role in fueling civil conflict. Still, the basic idea seemed wrong to me, because wars of that kind (maybe any kind) strike me as unique, and because the end of civil conflict rarely relies substantially on a well-designed accord or agreement. If such an agreement takes hold, it is because there are more complex political, economic or social transformations underway in response to war: one class of elites is losing its grip on resources or its ability to coordinate social action. Two social groups have decided they have more to gain through some kind of accord than they have to gain through all-out war. A new generation of political leaders have mobilized a new political base, or have acquired a new vision through education or novel forms of socialization. Maybe a charismatic leader helps to sway elite opinion or coordinate mass action. In any event, none of that is created by an agreement: the agreement, if meaningful, is a visible sign of more complex transformations.

Do I see that in Zimbabwe right now? Not especially. Part of the problem is that the people I need to be able to see are invisible to me and even to most observers closer to the scene. Mugabe is not the issue. The issue is the upper ranks of various security services. The issue is the upper elite of the ruling party, and for that matter, the mid-level apparatchiks. What have they decided, if they’re conscious of having decided anything?

If they do not help to make the words in the agreement real, the agreement will not be anything but a potential trap for the opposition. By themselves, the opposition cannot make power-sharing or political reform a reality. Without the security apparatus ceding some power, without institutional elites conceding to or joining in reform, this is just one more case of ZANU-PF’s long-running tactic of neutralizing opposition by momentarily appearing to bring it inside the fold. All of the most adroit authoritarian regimes in postcolonial Africa have practiced this technique. (Mobutu, for example, was a master of it.)

The real signs of movement or change will appear in the next three months, if the agreement was meaningful rather than a brief intermission in a long, depressing drama. The official media in the next three months will be telling. Not whether it praises the power-sharing deal: that would just be more of the same. What would be really telling is opening up the state-run newspaper and television station to a diversity of views, or to good reportage. Or privatizing the official media outright. Watch fiscal policy: if reform is really taking hold, the central bank will start acting like one. Watch how the police and military move and act: if they’re going to allow a political transformation, they’ll start their own processes of reform and begin to stay out of Zimbabwe’s public affairs. And so on.

If the only visible sign of the accord is that Morgan Tsvangirai has a new title and ostensibly speaks for the government on television from time to time, then nothing really happened and the agreement is just another of the many ten-point plans that mediators and policy experts (Africans or Westerners) have helped to draft as figleafs to cover their own impotence.

Horn of Africa Redux

Wednesday, September 10th, 2008

Matthew Yglesias has a polite “I told you so” up regarding the current situation in Somalia and Ethiopia.

I’ll have one of what he’s having, bartender.

One-A-Day: Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, Pathfinders: A Global History of Exploration

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

I’m going to start trying again to write comments on the reading I’ve been doing over the last six months. It hasn’t been quite one-a-day, but there’s a lot of books and articles in my backlog to talk about.

Pathfinders is like other works of global history by Fernandez-Armesto: a readable, pleasant synthesis that doesn’t add much to a historian’s analytic toolkit, but it puts narratives and information that have often been told in a markedly Eurocentric way into a broader comparative perspective.

I’m going to focus on one specific thing I noticed in this book that I think speaks to a wider problem in the writing of global histories of this kind. Fernandez-Armesto works very hard to draw in examples and cases from most regions of the world, particularly when he’s talking about premodern exploration. When he gets to 1500, he serves up a modest amount of Iberiocentrism, but he’s honest about that, and rather charming. Plus it’s hard to argue against the centrality of Spain and Portugal in maritime exploration from 1500 to 1650.

However, this drive to globalize history often draws world historians into a complicated tension with area studies specialists. I’ve been very clear about my dissatisfaction with the tendency towards intellectual parochalism among Africanists, but some of that tendency is rooted in some genuinely important priorities.

Here’s an example drawn from Pathfinders. Early in the book, Fernandez-Armesto is talking about early cartographic or navigational practices in human societies, and reasonably concludes that there must have been some practices employed in some early premodern societies beyond dumb luck. Absolutely: it’s completely fair to infer that premodern human societies may have had all variety of interesting mnemonic and representational techniques for remembering or communicating how to go from here to there, and some of these may be of profound antiquity.

In this discussion, he uses a few African examples that unfortunately illustrate the intellectual predicament of Africanist historians.The way he uses Africa is as many world or comparative historians do: by citing recently observed practices that suggest what was likely done in antiquity by all humans. This is the conventional logic of using 19th or early 20th Century Africa as if it were a window into prehistory, unchanged tradition. The examples Fernandez-Armesto uses specifically in this case are Marcel Griaule’s work on Dogon cosmology with its map-like constructions, MacGaffey’s work on Kongo cosmographs, and scholarship on 20th Century Luba chiefship ceremonies which include geographical knowledge of sacred and ritual sites.

The problem is that all of these examples, Africanist scholars know, are anything but unchanged windows into the distant human past: they’re practices and ideas that have almost certainly changed considerably over time AND they were described by and in some cases actively reinvented by Western officials and scholars with very bounded ideas and preconceptions about African history and society. There’s a considerable mini-literature on Griaule and his intellectual history that makes it impossible to take anything he wrote or said about Dogon cosmology at face value. MacGaffey has noted that cosmographs as he describes them strike him as both recent and highly dynamic, changeable inventions.

These examples tell you about the distant human past about as much as saying, “Contemporary Americans often give directions to important locations by citing commercial landmarks rather than formal maps, e.g., ‘Take a left at the Kentucky Fried Chicken, if you pass the Wal-Mart you’ve gone too far’”. That actually does tell you in a universal, general sense about how people might have navigated in early societies, but it doesn’t tell you any specifics. Fernandez-Armesto regards recent African examples as directly suggestive of practice in antiquity (e.g., not just general illustrations, but “Maybe here’s how the Dogon did it back then” or “The Luba probably valued this kind of geographical knowledge back in prehistory and remembered it through chiefly investiture and oral tradition.”) Africanists know that there weren’t any Luba as such in the early premodern period that Fernandez-Armesto is working with early in his book, any more than there were suburban Long Islanders with lawns and backyard swing sets in Neolithic times.

But when the Africanist gets all snippy about this problem, insisting in almost cliched terms that African societies were also dynamic and historical and changing, the world historian or comparativist says eagerly, “Great, so tell me about what West African societies were like around 200 AD or so, especially any details on their cartographic or geographical practices, so I can give some examples that compare to Rome, China, Arabia, and so on”. And here the Africanist mostly has to say, “Sorry, don’t know. Pretty much can’t know, not at that level of specificity.” Or even more sheepishly, “Well, I can tell you what a handful of Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and South Asian sources say about those places, but a lot of that is little more than thrice-told stories from merchants.” Plus the Africanist can make use of some archaeology and linguistics, but as Fernandez-Armesto points out, there are a great many imaginable geographic or cartographic practices in prehistory or antiquity which may have left no material or artifactual record behind.

So now the world historian has to ask, “So, how about it, guys? Should I just leave Africa out of what I’m talking about unless I have highly specific, properly historicized examples, which means it’s going to be left out of a lot of my account, or should I use whatever I can find, and without a lot of methodological song-and-dance each time I do so, because that’s going to mess with the readability and coherence of my synthesis”.

Africanists often seem to reply, “Either one, you choose, and we’ll complain about it either way”. The problem is that the complaint in either case has some validity to it, but the global historian’s choice either way is also fairly valid. I don’t have an easy answer. On some subjects, there may well be a chronologically appropriate comparison for a global historian to use that comes from Africa or Mesoamerica or Oceania. On many others, the details and specificity in premodern world history are going to come from literate, record-keeping societies even when we can be fairly certain that there were examples of the same practices or institutions or ideas in non-literate societies elsewhere in the world.

The Revolution of Letting Go

Tuesday, July 22nd, 2008

I’m a little late in my remarks on Nelson Mandela’s 90th birthday, but it’s the thought that counts.

It has been fascinating to watch Mandela’s name becoming the synonym for the best combination of political power and ethical commitment, the way that “Einstein” signifies science or “Gandhi” signifies righteous protest. That apotheosis tends over time to smooth away the humanity and particular history of that person: the fact that Einstein was wrong about some key issues or that he was not just a loveably kooky thinker gets lost, the historical peculiarity of Gandhi’s syncretism and the tactical problems with his formulation of nationalism gets lost.

The complexity and humanity of Mandela’s life, which Mandela himself has always insistently emphasized as a key part of his political strategy, is at equal risk, and in this case, it’s vital that the world and South Africa not excise that from the way we remember him.

By his own account, Mandela’s time in the ANC Youth League located him within the standard histories and traditions of African nationalism at the time of its greatest flourishing, and by his own account, had that been the alpha and omega of his political experience, he would not have been the leader that he became in the 1990s. His time in prison forced him to accept that the achievement of freedom was a long game rather than a hasty political settlement. It required a steel-edged pragmatism both about negotiating with his oppressors (whether prison authorities or the apartheid state) and about accomodating ideological divergence among his allies. The prison years gave depth and reality to Mandela’s courtroom stand against tyranny both white and black, to his understanding that a free society would take more than changing the race of the prison guards or the ruling bureaucrats.

Before 1990, Mandela was no more than symbol except to those who actually came to know him within Robben Island. He could have walked out of prison and stumbled quickly on feet of clay. If Mandela has become the patron saint of the ethical use of political power, it is because of what he did when he came out of jail.

Two things especially stand out for me. First, that he agreed to testify on the stand about the Browde Commission of Inquiry’s work on rugby when he was called to do so by a judge, even though the case was motivated by political mischief. This was the real revolution: establishing that the executive in South Africa is governed by the law, rather than floating immaculately above it. All free societies must constantly revisit that moment. Every new leadership carries within it the threat to cut loose from constraints on its power, whether we’re talking about South Africa or the United States. But Mandela established this precedent in South Africa under circumstances where almost no one would have criticized him for failing to do so.

More importantly, perhaps, is that Mandela left power eagerly at the end of his appointed time, again under circumstances where hardly anyone would have stood against him had he chosen to ask for more. He did not merely leave office: he let go the political reins entirely. It’s equally important that he has carefully and selectively exercised his moral authority since entirely within the bounds of civil society, given his successor’s inability to value the independence of civil society.

Mandela is a genuinely extraordinary person, and the world is right to regard him as such. It’s important that in the rush to sanctify him we do not forget that his most admirable achievements ought to be a burr and irritant to his successors rather than a balm, a caution against the arrogance of power everywhere. Much as I think the leadership of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe has demonstrated that at least some postcolonial failures in Africa rest on the moral, philosophical, and personal failures of a small handful of individuals, Mandela demonstrates the opposite, that in some cases, it’s possible to have done better because of individual determination and commitment. It doesn’t discount the importance of social history to recognize that occasionally, the Great Person Theory of History has some real analytical force to it.

The People Are The Enemy

Tuesday, June 24th, 2008

There’s not a lot to say about Zimbabwe that I have not already said. Things are bad, they don’t look to get better, they have the potential to get even worse, hard as that is to imagine. It’s not about Mugabe the person as much as the military, police and top leadership of ZANU-PF. The named political institutions visible on the surface of the Zimbabwean government are now completely hollowed out by the steady violence of the party elite and military-police leadership against any civic institutions, against anyone who actually tries to exercise meaningfully constructive administrative power, against anything but their own power. Under the circumstances, I think Morgan Tsvangirai had no choice but to withdraw from the run-off, though he and his party also never seem to me to have anticipated or thought through what they were doing.

There remains little that most outside interests can do. Even most sanctions don’t strike me as being potentially effective. I had to really stifle a thunderbolt of rage at one posting on a scholarly listserv that I read when one scholar proferred the argument that although Mugabe is a tyrant, it’s really the fault of the United States and Great Britain, and that the real political challenge is to keep them from interfering. That’s a tragic case of stupid addiction to old dogma, dogma that was analytically wrong-headed in the first place. If I could think of a way for the US and UK to usefully interfere beyond what they’re doing already, I’d encourage them to do it. Western intellectuals and scholars concerned with Africa often still treat sovereignty as an obsessive and magical political objective, as if its mere fact insures a better world.

Or more dubiously, treat some African states today as if they have yet to achieve sovereignty. I think it’s perfeclty fair to say that there are postcolonial states in Africa who have never had a functioning government, nor have ever achieved any kind of central control over the territory marked for them on the map. Zimbabwe is not one of those states. The people in power now, who have been in power for twenty-eight years, have long had a great measure of control over their territory. Zimbabwe is the opposite of the conventional “failed state”: its rulers have very significant capacity for violence and political control across most of their national territory, even with the economy in tatters. It demonstrates perfectly that the mere achievement of sovereign power and strong governmental authority guarantees nothing, improves nothing. When some contemporary Zimbabweans mutter that the last twenty years or so of Rhodesian power were preferable to the last decade of independence, it’s hard to disagree. That this statement alone is more likely to horrify concerned Western liberals than any number of ghastly utterances by Zimbabwean authorities in the last decade says a lot about the limited perspectives of those liberals. It’s not that we should have to choose between Smith’s Rhodesia and Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: the former was forever stunted, the latter an unending disaster. The problem is with those who believed and sometimes continue to believe that the mere fact of succession by Mugabe over Smith was progress in its own right.

South Africa’s leaders, and to a lesser extent other southern African governments, do have meaningful leverage. As I’ve written in a number of places, they’re not likely to exercise it with some important exceptions because they define their achievement of sovereignty in negative terms against the West, that they are only sovereign as long as they don’t appear to be doing the bidding of the West. Moreover, some, very much including Mbeki and probably Jacob Zuma, don’t want to condemn some of what the Zimbabwean authorities have done because they want to notionally reserve the right to do the same things at some future date. The Zimbabwean government violently cleared out urban populations that they saw as a political danger and a visible sign of disorder; other postcolonial states have done and may anticipate doing similar things. The Zimbabwean government has and is using violence to manage or curtail ostensibly democratic processes, to seize property, to crush the press. Thabo Mbeki made it clear in his time in power that he sees independent or critical forces within civil society as a temporary encumbrance.

The Zimbabwean state is not alone in the world in its undisguised loathing for its own population, as we’ve seen in the last year. One of the interesting problems for the 21st Century is, “How can such a state survive?” The tragic answer so far seems to be, “Rather easily”. The only states which seem in danger of serious, rapid political transformation in the present (as in the past) are those in which the rising expectations of social classes with some independence from governmental power and some measure of independent access to global circulations of money and information push back hard against authoritarian overreach. Zimbabwe or Myanamar are not in that kind of circumstance and for the near-term they’re not likely to be.

Back to Not Out of Africa

Thursday, April 24th, 2008

Maybe because it’s April, I’m in one of my periodic bouts of skepticism about blogging. I spoke earlier this semester to a class about my practice as an online writer, and the occasion made me realize that I’m really starting to feel gun-shy about some discussions of academic policy and scholarship. That’s partly because of a long-time concern about whether I’m repeating myself, but also that I don’t simply want to serve as the perpetual straight man in someone else’s Punch-and-Judy show.

I feel like academic blogging should reflect some of the characteristic, defining virtues of scholarly and intellectual work. No, not densely unreadable prose, not overspecialization, not the proverbial viciousness of small stakes. Thoughtfulness, a commitment to look at issues from many perspectives, a potentially self-critical embrace of skepticism, a belief that knowledge matters. Even if it’s only to keep in practice as a skilled thinker and rhetoritician, an academic blogger ought to be able to get inside the claims and logic of an intellectual with whom they disagree and see how and why those arguments work for that person or school of thought.

If we’re trying to preserve, restore or even invent for the first time a better, more effective and more open academy, those strike me as foundational commitments, whether the goal is a Great Books-based “core curriculum” or an eclectic curriculum with little internal structure or design. No sacred cows, all ideas and claims subject to ongoing skeptical review, all teachers and students committed to both persuading and being open to persuasion. Most importantly, making arguments that are proportional to the evidence or knowledge that we bring to the table, and offered provisionally as a result.

I have some basic theoretical, conceptual, political and institutional predispositions (as we all do) and those tend to incline me in particular ways when I’m thinking about any scholarly or intellectual claim I come across. My confidence level and specificity of argument go way up in certain domains (African history, popular culture, information technology and new media, computer games and virtual worlds, the comparative history of imperialism, the history of hygiene and beauty, and so on). I still feel on solid ground if I’m speaking to claims made in most fields of historical study, or in anthropology, or in cultural studies, but I become more conscious that there may be specific arguments, ideas and facts which I have to be humble about. As I go further away from my own areas of competency, my views may grow more tentative and vague. I still think they’re valuable in that form. I still think I have something worth saying about why civil engineering or neurobiology or quantum mechanics might matter, and what claims they might make which I need to take seriously and which I might view with some skepticism. At that point, however, not only do I need to be humble and know where generalist tools cannot take me, I also need to be genuinely curious, to ask other scholars and intellectuals to explain or translate their knowledge to me and trust in their representations. Up to a point: I don’t have to concede to a particular neurobiologist that human consciousness is nothing more than a machine or an epiphenomena, or trust the civil engineer that public money needs to be spent on one purpose and not another. I do need to understand why they think so, though, and not just blithely override their claims based on more general intuition or inclination.

Excuse the throat-clearing. Some of what got me thinking about these issues was looking back over past entries in preparation for my guest appearance. The immediate goad, though, was a post about classicist Mary Lefkowitz’ work on Afrocentrism, and her new memoir about her experiences after publishing Not Out of Africa.

Whether we’re talking about the original exchanges between Lefkowitz and Martin Bernal or the way that exchange is recalled and repackaged for Culture Wars 2008, I’m frustrated by what is said and unsaid. Let’s start with Lefkowitz’ original book. I found it an interesting and provocative read. I was happy to use it in a number of classes, sometimes paired with a selection from the work of Molefi Kete Asante or Martin Bernal. Lefkowitz was in the eye of the storm, and so I’m not surprised that she understands the book and herself as having been entirely embattled. But away from the author and the Afrocentric intellectuals most strongly antagonized by her work, I think there were a lot of quieter, more thoughtful contexts where her work was read, used, discussed and evaluated within the basically scholarly norms that she has risen to defend. Here I really am repeating myself, but it’s important to underline this point: the most committed antagonists in the culture wars (then and now) habitually take the exceptional for the normal, the extreme practice as representative, highly public incident as quotidian reality. I think Lefkowitz has every right to feel aggrieved about some of what happened to her, and she’s right that there are various third rails waiting to be touched. That’s not the end or even the majority of the story, however.

In that quieter reading, some discussions opened up that weren’t possible in the intense crossfire generated by aggrieved Afrocentrists and aggrieved classicists. Some of these conversations I think Lefkowitz would have welcomed (indeed, some appear in various forms in the companion anthology Black Athena Revisited which she co-edited). For example, there’s a significant difference between Martin Bernal’s claims about the intellectual history of classicist thinking about Greece and Egypt in 19th Century Europe and his empirical claims about classical Greece and Egypt. I think it’s possible to agree that there were some complicatedly racial dimensions of how classical Greece and Egypt were reinvented as subjects of study in 19th Century Western Europe without buying into anything Bernal says about the actual historical relationship between classical Greece and Egypt.

Similarly, as Lefkowitz and many of the contributors to Black Athena Revisited point out, “race” wasn’t a concept that made any sense in classical Egypt or classical Greece, at least not as we understand the term. Egypt by our standards was a multiracial society, but Egyptians of the time wouldn’t have understood that label. What that does signify, however, is that the way we have visually represented Egypt in the West in the last century has often omitted that racial variety. Afrocentric criticism often obsesses about that omission in terms of iconic figures like Cleopatra or Nefertiti, but where it really matters is in how we visualize “ordinary” Egyptians, whether in Hollywood films, K-12 textbooks, or museum displays.

Another issue for me would simply be the privileged status of Greece and Rome within the concept of classics as a discipline. There are good reasons for that emphasis, but it depends on what kinds of issues are being studied or taught at any given moment. If the focus of the moment is on the Iliad as a literary work, fine: we really don’t have much from other societies in the eastern Mediterranean that compares. If the focus is a broader canvas of historical development, there is no reason why Asia Minor, Persia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, among other societies, shouldn’t be within the framework of classics, broadly speaking.

This strikes me as particularly important when it comes to a question like, “Who invented mathematics?” or “Where did some of the important ideas attributed to classical Greek philosophers really come from?” In certain ways, Lefkowitz and Bernal shared the same blindspot, namely, a belief that most of the “inventions” that they furiously debated really did come from singular gifted individuals or elite schools of thought. They shared a common conceptual vocabulary for talking about “invention” or “creation”, just a difference about attribution. When I look as a generalist historian at the classical era in the Eastern Mediterranean, it seems possible to suppose that many principles of mathematics, science and philosophy attributed to individuals or to a particular civilization were in more general circulation throughout the region, voiced as much by sailors, merchants and courtiers as by philosophers and citizens. We get the story about Archimedes and his bathtub from a Roman source more than a century after Archimedes’ death. It seems plausible to imagine that Archimedes formalized, intellectualized and extended existing practical knowledge for measuring volume.

This is my general reply to all debates about ownership, appropriation and theft as they have appeared in a lot of Afrocentric discourse and other identity politics. As the saying goes, they’re “not even wrong”, meaning that there’s something so conceptually flawed about the idea of “stealing” something like philosophy or mathematics that responding to these arguments with factual counter-arguments about who really invented philosophy (as Lefkowitz largely did) almost misses the real problem. It’s true that images, metaphors, tropes, ideas, beliefs and so on can develop an association with a particular society or a subculture. But none of those are owned in any straightforward sense, none of that activity is neatly bounded by a single society or culture. At least some major Afrocentric thinkers were highly influenced by Cheikh Anta Diop’s distinctive diffusionism, a belief in an original or root culture from which all later social and cultural life derives. But at least some kinds of invocations of classical Greece and Rome in the modern West have the same diffusionism, a sense that the West is simply a later iteration or lineal descendent of a Greco-Roman (or Judeo-Christian) original. I think this kind of diffusionism is a misfire no matter who is peddling it. It’s not just that ideas, images and so on are always in circulation, but that they do not travel across time and space intact with the stamp of their creator firmly discernable upon them. (Otherwise, if I can be forgiven a side comment on Diop and Bernal, the modern West is an African civilization, having stolen all of Africa’s original inventions.)

The next problem for me at this point is that I recognize that a lot of Afrocentric writing is striving to invent another kind of epistemology. Not Diop or Bernal: both of them are heavily dependent upon the norms of scholarly thought and practice, and therefore rightfully subject to criticism from them. (In methodological terms, I think Diop is in fact heavily and anachronistically Eurocentric, making heavy use of historical, archaeological and biological frameworks from the first half of the 20th Century.) Molefi Kete Asante, on the other hand, (in various and sometimes contradictory ways) has tried to imagine a different kind of epistemology that depends on mysterious or interior ways of knowing, on experience, on will or commitment, on structures of feeling. In that respect, he’s more typical of Afrocentric thought both inside and outside the academy.

I am like Lefkowitz in thinking that this kind of epistemology comprehensively breaks with important scholarly norms. On some level, I feel that the more comprehensive the break, the more that such a dissenting epistemology really needs to seek a new institutional home for itself, to leave the academy as it stands. But do I really think that consistently, and does she? Do we really want to chase all epistemological dissidents out of colleges and universities? What about a scholar who comes to feel that practice, rather than knowledge, ought to be the main source of intellectual authority in their field? How about the scholar of Christianity who accepts that there are ways of spiritual knowing in Christianity which can’t be captured or represented by conventional scholarly forms and claims, and that it is a scholarly obligation to try and think from within those ways of knowing? What about a literary critic interested in the sublime, or some other aspect of creativity or representation that can’t be fully described within scholarly knowledge by its very nature? What about studio artists, novelists, performers whose practice isn’t scholarly in the way that history or physics are? What about a scholar who argues, for principled reasons, that some issue within their own discipline cannot be known by scholarly inquiry?

On some level, Afrocentrists are quite right that in the history of Africa (and in contemporary African societies) there are other ways of knowing about the world, many of them quite structured, with potential for formalization and institutional use. Arguing that those ways of knowing have no place in universities (while other inventions or dissident forms do have a place) takes some heavy intellectual lifting.

If we cleaned house of all epistemological dissent, we would not only impoverish our scholarship and teaching, we would remove the ongoing ferment of skepticism that we all need for the continued health and renewal of scholarly life. This is my problem about some of the academics and outsiders who call for a return to the canon, about back-to-the-basics, about traditions and core curricula. They take it for granted that the value of these practices is already long since understood, that there is no need to renew an argument on their behalf. In this sense, Afrocentrism did Mary Lefkowitz a favor: she had to think about and then communicate why she valued the intellectual and institutional practices that she rose to defend. I don’t think in that sense that John Leo does Lefkowitz much of a favor by just using her as another pawn on the Culture War chessboard. Defending one form of scholarly practice from the argument that there are other important ways of knowing isn’t an easy job, but a hard one.

Playing Reindeer Games

Tuesday, April 8th, 2008

In her op-ed on Robert Mugabe, Heidi Holland portrays him partially as a wayward child of Western civilization who has his nose pressed against the glass, hoping to be invited back in from the cold from whence his “heathen granny” came. In her interview with him, Holland writes, Mugabe “expressed almost tearful regret at his inability to socialize with the Queen of England”.

It’s easy to laugh this portrait off as a product of Holland’s own naivete. I know that I no longer accept the view that Mugabe was once committed to national reconciliation after 1980 and somehow lost that commitment along the way, a trope that Holland recycles in her essay. Looking back, what I see instead is Mugabe’s typically hard-nosed assessment of the power available to him at the time. He and the core of his party needed time to gain control of the mechanisms of the state they had inherited, to consolidate national power. I do not think it was an accident that he turned on rival nationalists before dealing with other potential opponents, including the white farmers, trade unionists and the tattered remnants of a liberal civil society that the Rhodesians had done their best to destroy before Mugabe ever took power. I think the Mugabe who ruthlessly took control of his own party before independence, stalled with reconciliation tactics after independence, and flushed his nation’s economy down the toilet are pretty much the same person, acting with similar underlying impulses in all those situations.

That said, I think Holland is also right that he wants the respect of the West and inclusion within the contours of what colonial society in Africa defined as “civilization”. Mugabe has put his personal stamp on this desire: the steely Jesuitical temperment, the fastidiousness and relative minimalism of his public presentation, the building of a strong state apparatus that centers on his personal authority but is not reducible to a cult of personality. (Whatever else its problems might be, Zimbabwe does not suffer from a failure of state capacity or a weak sovereignty: the state has real, persistent power throughout most of its territory, very much including a monopoly on violence.) He doesn’t exhibit the romantic Europhilia of Leopold Senghor, or the eccentric Homburg-wearing hippiephobia of Hastings Banda. Mugabe doesn’t indulge in the kid-in-the-candy-store splurges of the most vulgar of postcolonial African leaders (though he has plenty of ill-gotten gains from his time in power), or hanker to build a reputation for being a reliable subscriber to the Washington Consensus like Museveni or Rowlings, so as to get an invitation or two to Davos from time to time.

One of the basic problems in studying modern African history is that African experience is most copiously represented back to knowledge-making by people who were the most transformed by colonial rule and the most conflicted about that transformation. In some ways, this is the same reason that identity politics within Western societies often finds its most tenacious adherents not among the most marginal or excluded subjects but among middle classes and aspirants who are both trying to preserve fragile and hard-won access to professional or bourgeois life and secure further pathways for aspiration through arguments about identity, history and social justice.

Just observing that African nationalist politics came into being out of frustration and rage by nationalist elites or evolues at their racially-based exclusion from the ranks of “civilized men” is not a critique. It’s boring and simple-minded to write this history off as hypocrisy or contradiction. However, African nationalism has tended to regard such an analysis as an attack precisely because its usual mythological reinventions after post-independence consolidations of power describe African nation-states as the product of the massification of nationalism in the march to independence. Calling attention to the social history of African nationalism, its historical particularism, is a rebuke to African nationalism’s ideology whether we wish to make that rebuke or not.

Scorning or mocking the nationalist’s earnest desire for inclusion in some aspect of the “civilizing mission” is just another kind of hating the hybrid, the cosmopolitan, the miscegenated, the “man of two worlds”. Mugabe is not distinguished from other African elites, or modern political classes in general, in his desire to be taken seriously by Queen Elizabeth and Tony Blair, to be authenticated not just as a been-to but a have-become. When Chief Munhuwepayi Mangwende was deposed by the Rhodesian government in 1960, at least one of the reasons was the bitter jealousy of a local white district officer who resented that the chief had access to high British society while the white bureaucrat did not.

One of the most interesting things I’ve ever read in an archive is a letter from David Gurupira to the Chief Native Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia in 1938. As I read it, Gurupira isn’t a simple collaborator, motivated by calculating self-interest. Instead, I think he’s someone who has assessed and imagined aspects of the colonizer’s world and power and wants to selectively include himself within some of what he envisions it to be. He hasn’t lost himself, or forgotten his history. His mind hasn’t been colonized. He isn’t slavish or empty. The officials who received his letter were not the imperial buffoons that we often see in stereotypical accounts, either. They understood what Gurupira was saying: “his facts are substantially correct”. The tragedy of colonialism is that they could only offer to him the right to bear arms, rather than acknowledge his claims or open up their own power to his gentle demands.

This might sound as if I’m agreeing with Holland that the West need only embrace Mugabe and give him his due, invite him into the social apparatus of global power, grant him the cultural capital to which he is entitled. By no means. When we condemn Mugabe harshly, when we make of him a pariah, we are including him. The most condescending, exclusionary option would be to pat him on the head like a good little non-Westerner and say, “Well, he doesn’t know any better, the little tyke. He can’t help being an authoritarian. Besides, isn’t it our own fault anyway that he is? We did promise to help out with land reform, chaps.” As long as we’re even-handed in demanding liberty everywhere always, as long as we don’t hold Mugabe accountable for actions that are forgiven of reliable authoritarian clients, as long as we don’t excuse fraud, corruption, cronyism and the concentration of unaccountable executive power when it is expedient for our own purposes, then the harshest attacks on Mugabe’s conduct as a political leader are just as welcoming as a royal reception with Queen Elizabeth II.